We distinguish between two ways a mechanism can fail to be strategyproof. A mechanism may have manipulations that persist with market size (rst-order manipulations); and, a mechanism may have manipulations that vanish with market size (second-order manipulations). We say that a non-strategyproof mechanism is strategyproof for price takers (SP (p)) if all of its manipulations vanish with market size. We put price takers in quotes because our notion is not limited to mechanisms that explicitly use prices. Our main result is that, given a mechanism with Bayes-Nash or complete information Nash equilibria, there exists a prior free mechanism that is SP (p) and that coincides exactly with the original mechanism in the limit. It coincides approximately in large nite markets, with exponential rate of convergence. Thus, while strategyproofness often severely limits what kinds of mechanisms are possible, for our class of problems SP (p) does not, and hence may be a useful second-best. We illustrate our concepts with examples from single-unit assignment, multiunit assignment, matching and auctions.
Introduction
Strategyproofness i.e., that playing the game truthfully is a dominant strategy is perhaps the predominant notion of incentive compatibility in practical market design. There are at least four important reasons why strategyproofness is so heavily emphasized relative to other forms of incentive compatibility, such as Bayes-Nash. First, strategyproof mechanisms are detail free for the designer, Waiter: Sorry, we only consider your rst choice of entree. Since Fish wasn't your rst choice, we won't serve you that either.
This restaurant, too, is not strategyproof ; and in this instance, we imagine that most researchers would indeed nd cause to complain about this restaurant's ordering protocol.
We propose a conceptual distinction between two kinds of non-strategyproofness:
(i) a mechanism may have protable manipulations that persist with market size (rst-order manipulations); and (ii) a mechanism may have protable manipulations that vanish with market size (second-order manipulations). The restaurant with the strange ordering procedure is rst-order manipulable: customers will frequently want to misreport their preferences at a restaurant with those rules, independently of the number of and behavior of patrons of that restaurant (which may be small given those rules!) or of the number of and behavior of agents participating in the global chicken market. The normal restaurant is not rst-order manipulable; if we ignore any individual customer's ability to aect the global price of chicken tomorrow, then today's decision between chicken and sh is exactly strategyproof. However, it is second-order manipulable, because of the vanishingly likely possibility that an individual customer aects global prices.
If a mechanism has second-order but not rst-order manipulations it is not strategyproof, but it is what we will call strategyproof for price takers, or SP (p). We put price takers in quotations because our notion is not limited to mechanisms that explicitly use prices; indeed, there are many examples of nonprice-based mechanisms that are strategyproof for the kinds of agents economists think of as price takers, and many examples of price-based mechanisms that are not. We argue that, when strategyproof alternatives are unattractive, SP (p) may be a useful second-best incentives criterion; that is, at the very least, market designers should seek to avoid rst-order manipulations.
Our rst main result is that, under conditions that are satised in many widely studied market-design settings private values, anonymity, and continuity rst-order manipulations can be avoided for free in the large market limit. More specically, we show the following. Suppose there is some mechanism that is both rst-and second-order manipulable, and that has Bayes-Nash or complete information Nash equilibria that implement some outcomes as a function of agents' preferences. We show by construction that there exists another mechanism that is SP (p), and that implements exactly the same outcomes as the equilibria of the original mechanism in the limit. That is, in the limit, we can get the attractive aspects of strategyproof design detail-freeness, strategic simplicity, fairness, tractability for free.
We describe our main result in the context of a specic example, the Boston mechanism for school choice. The Boston mechanism resembles the rst-order manipulable restaurant described above. Students report their preferences for schools, and then as many students as possible are awarded their rst choice; only after as many students as possible have been awarded their rst choice are second choices considered. In practice, by the time second choices are considered most of the good schools have already reached capacity; so the system eectively only cares about your rst choice, just like the restaurant. Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (2003) and Abdulkadiroglu et al (2006) criticized the Boston mechanism on the grounds that it is not strategyproof. These papers proposed that the strategyproof Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm be used instead; indeed, the Gale-Shapley algorithm was eventually adopted for use in practice (cf. Roth, 2008 ).
However, as mentioned above, strategyproofness often has costs relative to other forms of incentive compatibility. A second generation of papers on the Boston mechanism argued that the Boston mechanism has a Bayes-Nash equilibrium that yields greater student welfare than does the dominant strategy equilibrium of the Gale-Shapley procedure (Abdulkadiroglu, Che and Yasuda, 2011; Miralles, 2008; Featherstone and Niederle, 2009 ). These papers argued that the rst generation papers mentioned in the previous paragraph were too quick to dismiss the Boston mechanism in favor of strategyproof deferred acceptance.
Bayes-Nash equilibria have their own costs. These second generation papers rely on students having common knowledge of the distribution of other students' preferences; on students being able to coordinate on a specic equilibrium; on students being able to make very precise strategic calculations to determine whether to risk asking for the chicken; etc. Our main result says that all of this complexity and non-robustness is unnecessary in a large market. Specically, in the large market limit, there must exist yet another mechanism that implements the same outcomes as these desirable Bayes-Nash equilibria of the Boston mechanism, but with dominant strategy incentives. Put dierently, our result says that even though nite market strategyproofness genuinely limits the scope of what is possible to implement in this environment, strategyproofness for price takers does not: the rst-order manipulations of the Boston mechanism can be eliminated for free in the large market limit.
Our second main result is about economies away from the limit, i.e. large nite economies. Suppose there exists a mechanism, e.g. the Boston mechanism described above, that has Bayes-Nash equilibria in nite economies. Our second result says that there exists another mechanism that is detail free for the designer, has no rst-order manipulations for the participants (i.e., is SP (p)), has vanishingly many second-order manipulations, and yields approximately the same outcomes as the Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the original mechanism. Further, we show that both approximations in this new mechanism the number of second-order manipulations, and the dierence in outcomes vanish exponentially with market size.
We emphasize that there exist mechanisms that do not appear to have any explicit prices but that satisfy our notion of SP (p), and also that there exist mechanisms that do have explicit prices but that are not SP (p). Examples of the former include Gale and Shapley's (1962) deferred acceptance algorithm for two-sided matching, Bogomolnaia and Moulin's (2001) probabilistic serial mechanism for single-unit assignment problems, and Budish and Cantillon's (2011) proxy draft for multi-unit assignment problems. Examples of the latter include the pay-as-bid multi-object auction used until the 1990s by the US Treasury to allocate US government debt (cf. Friedman 1991) , and the Bidding Points Auction used by many business schools and law schools to allocate courses to students (cf. Sonmez and Unver, 2010; Budish, 2010). Friedman (1964 Friedman ( , 1991 ) is of special note. He not only criticizes the pay-as-bid auction, but suggests that the US government switch to the uniform price auction instead.
The uniform price auction also is not strategyproof. However, uniform price nism. Each of these papers provides a defense of a specic mechanism based on its incentive properties in large markets. Our paper aims to justify strategyproofness for price takers as a general desideratum for practical market design. Note that in the context of any of the specic mechanisms named above, our analysis is much less instructive than are previous analyses tailored to the specic mechanism.
Technically, our paper is most closely related to Kalai (2004) . Kalai (2004;  Theorem 1) shows that Bayes-Nash equilibria are approximately ex-post Nash in a class of large continuous and anonymous games.
3 In words, if a large number of agents with private information about their types play some BNE, then expost i.e. after seeing each agent's chosen action agents will have vanishingly 2 The debate about whether to favor uniform price or pay-as-bid auctions continues to this day. In the context of design discussions concerning the US Treasury's Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), Ausubel and Cramton (2008) criticize the strategic complexity of pay-as-bid auctions as follows: Bidders hate pay-as-bid auctions, as they look foolish (or unemployed) after selling at unnecessarily low prices. See also Ausubel and Cramton (1996) for an analysis that shows that the uniform-price auction proposed by Friedman is not strategyproof.
3 Recent work by Azrieli and Shmaya (2011) shows that continuity is the crucial assumption in Kalai (2004) , and that anonymity can be relaxed. Recent work by Bodoh-Creed (2010) shows that Kalai-like assumptions imply a close relationship between games with a continuum of players and games with a large nite number of players.
little incentive to revise their play. The dierence between our Theorem 2 and Kalai's Theorem 1 is that Kalai shows that a given BNE is approximately expost Nash, whereas we use the BNE of a given mechanism to create a new mechanism that is approximately strategyproof. In our new mechanism players need not have common knowledge of the prior, or of what equilibrium is being played, nor need they be strategically sophisticated in any way.
Third, our paper is related to the literature on the role of strategyproofness in practical market design. Wilson (1987) something more useful about non-strategyproof mechanisms than simply that they are not strategyproof. See also Milgrom (2011; Section IV) for a general discussion of these issues. We view our approach as complementary to these prior approaches. An advantage of our approach is that it yields an explicit design desideratum, namely that mechanisms be strategyproof for price takers.
Organization of the paper The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes the environment and some key assumptions. Section 3 denes strategyproof for price takers and related concepts. Section 4 goes through several examples. Section 5 presents the main theoretical results. Section 6 concludes.
Environment
Mechanisms Many papers ask what kinds of mechanisms are possible given a single, commonly known probability distribution, and/or a single market size n.
In this paper, we are interested in mechanisms that are well dened for a range of market sizes and that are detail free for the designer, in the sense that the probability distribution over agents' types does not enter into the mechanism description (cf. Wilson, 1987) . For these reasons we dene a mechanism as follows: Denition 1. A mechanism is a nite action space A, a nite set of possible (sure) outcomes X 0 for the agents, with X = ∆X 0 the set of lotteries of over outcomes, and a sequence of functions
that maps a vector of n actionsā into a vector of n random allocations Φ n (ā). A particular function in the sequence, for a particular size n, is called an n-mechanism.
An outcome might be the consumption bundle an agent receives, a match partner, a social decision, etc.. Since our interest is in mechanisms that induce truthful reporting, it is important that there be a well-dened notion of truthful.
Denition 2. Associated with each mechanism is a nite type space Θ, vNM utility functions u θ : X 0 → R + for each θ ∈ Θ, and an onto function τ : Θ → A.
Note that our setup implicitly assumes that agents have private values, in the sense that their preferences depend only on their own type.
To illustrate our terminology, consider the Boston mechanism for school choice, described above. In that mechanism the action space A is the set of ordinal preference rankings over schools. The appropriate type space Θ is the discretized set of von-Neumann Morgenstern utility functions over schools, which is a larger space. The truthful play of type θ is simply the ordinal preference ranking associated with that type's vNM utility function.
The assumption that τ is onto means that each action is the truthful play of some type. This allows us to speak of an agent playing θ; we use this to mean that the agent plays action τ (θ). Whenever we use a type θ ∈ Θ as an argument of a mechanism, we mean the associated action τ (θ) ∈ A.
Two key assumptions of our analysis are that mechanisms are anonymous and equicontinuous. We dene these in turn, following the terminology of Kalai A mechanism (Φ n ) N is anonymous if, for every n, and everyā andā with emp(ā) = emp(ā ) and a i = a j , we have 
Assumption 2. Mechanisms are continuous in actions.
Equicontinuity in actions requires that if the empirical distribution of others' actions changes by a small amount, then the payo to any particular action changes by a small amount. Note that the amount by which each individual agent's play aects the overall distribution of actions grows small with market size; specically, the maximum eect a single agent can have on this measure in a market with n participants is 1 n . Below, we will dene analogous notions of continuity with respect to reports and with respect to strategies.
Standard Equilibrium Concepts
Suppose there are n agents, and consider a measure m on the set of types, i.e., m ∈ ∆Θ. Let:
where θ −i is an n − 1 vector of types distributed iid according to m. The object φ n (θ i |m) is a random bundle in X that describes what a generic agent i can expect to receive from the n -mechanism Φ n (·) when he reports θ i and the other n − 1 agents report according to m. Recall that we equate reporting type θ i ∈ Θ with playing action τ (θ i ) ∈ A.
A strategy is a map σ : Θ → ∆Θ, assigning for each type a probability distribution over reports (which in turn induces a probability distribution over actions, via τ (·)). Given a probability distribution m ∈ ∆Θ over types and a strategy σ(·), denote by σ(m) the induced distribution over reports.
This is the standard denition of Bayes Nash Equilibrium in our notation.
In words, the strategy σ * µ is a BNE if each agent's expected utility from playing according to σ * µ is higher than that from any other action, given that the other 4 We believe that all of the results in this preliminary analysis can be obtained if we relax anonymity to semi-anonymity (Kalai, 2004) . Semi-anonymity accommodates many additional agents' types are distributed according to µ and that they also play according to σ * µ . Notice that there is no guarantee that σ * µ (θ) is the best strategy for an agent of type θ if the other agents play dierently, which could occur, e.g., if the other agents make systematic mistakes, or play a dierent equilibrium, or if their types have a dierent distribution than µ. Put dierently, even though mechanisms in our analysis are always detail free for the designer, the agents themselves will need to know the prior µ in order to play BNEs. 5 Another equilibrium concept with similar issues to worry about is complete information Nash equilibrium.
Denition 6. Aθ-complete information Nash equilibrium (θ-NE) of nmechanism Φ n is a strategy σ * θ (·) such that for all θ i ∈θ andθ i ∈ Θ:
The informational requirements for complete information Nash equilibria are arguably even more severe than for Bayes Nash. Agents must know both the equilibrium strategy σ * θ (·) and the precise realization of the distribution of the other players' types.
Part of the appeal of strategyproof mechanisms is that these informational requirements are no longer concerns. Specically:
Denitions (5)- (7) provide equilibrium concepts dened for a particular market size and, in the cases of BNE and NE, a particular distribution of opponent types. What does it mean for a mechanism to have equilibria for any market size and any prior? Denition 8. The mechanism (Φ n ) N has Bayes-Nash equilibria if, for any n and any µ ∈ ∆Θ, Φ n has a µ-BNE. The mechanism (Φ n ) N has complete information Nash equilibria if, for any n and anyθ ∈ Θ n , Φ n has aθ-NE. The mechanism {Φ n } n is strategyproof if, for any n, Φ n is strategyproof.
When researchers report that the Boston mechanism has attractive BayesNash equilibria, or that the Generalized Second Price Auction has attractive complete information Nash equilibria, or that the Random Serial Dictatorship is strategyproof, they are using these terms in the more universal sense of Denition 8.
5 By the standard revelation principle (cf. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991; Section 7.2), for any mechanism with a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which agents misreport their preferences, there exists a direct-revelation mechanism in which telling the truth is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
This direct-revelation mechanism, however, is no longer detail free for the designer; the map between types and outcomes will have to vary with the prior. For instance, in the directrevelation mechanism version of the rst-price sealed bid auction, the amount by which the center will shade each type's bid must vary with the prior in order for truthful reporting to be a BNE.
Continuity of Equilibria
For our main results in Section 5, we will need slightly dierent continuity assumptions from Kalai (2004) . Specically, our Theorems will be for mechanisms whose equilibria are equicontinuous, in the following sense:
Denition 9. A family of Bayes-Nash Equilibria σ n µ of mechanism (Φ n ) N is (equi)continuous in reports if, for every > 0, there exists a δ > 0 s.t.: for every n, µ, θ i ,θ i and any
The family is (equi)continuous in strategies if, for every > 0, there exists a δ > 0 s.t.: for every n, θ i ,θ i , θ −i , and any priors µ, µ with |µ − µ
In words, if a family of Bayes-Nash Equilibria is continuous in reports, a small change in the realized distribution of other players' types has just a small aect on a particular player's equilibrium payo. Continuity in reports is similar to Kalai's (2004) continuity in actions, but for the direct-revelation mechanism versions of the Bayes-Nash equilibria of (Φ n ) N . If the family is continuous in strategies, then a small change in the strategy all players use in equilibrium e.g., due to a small change in the prior has a small aect on a particular player's equilibrium payo.
Our Theorems 1 and 2 are for mechanisms that have equilibria satisfying these conditions, though what we really use is equicontinuity locally around the actual or conjectured play. Though strong, one possible interpretation of the conditions is the following: if a mechanism is not equicontinuous in the above sense, then the analyst's prediction of equilibrium outcomes is highly sensitive to small changes in information about the environment. This itself is arguably an undesirable feature of a mechanism.
The analogous denitions for complete information Nash equilibria are: Denition 10. A family of complete information Nash equilibria σ n θ of mechanism (Φ n ) N is (equi)continuous in reports if, for every > 0, there exists a δ > 0 s.t.: for every n, θ i ,θ i , and any
The family is (equi)continuous in strategies if, for every > 0, there exists a δ > 0 s.t.: for every n, θ i ,θ i , and any
Our Theorems 3 and 4 are for mechanisms that have equilibria satisfying these conditions.
Strategyproofness for Price Takers
Suppose that Φ n is not strategyproof. This means that there exist θ i ,θ i , θ −i such that
i.e., an agent of type θ i would like to misreport asθ i . In this section we distinguish between two such kinds of manipulations. Some manipulations persist with market size, whereas others vanish with market size. To formalize this distinction, we rst need the concept of a limit mechanism.
Limit Mechanisms
In an anonymous mechanism, each agent's outcome is a function of his own report and the distribution of all agents' reports. As a market grows larger, each individual agent's ability to inuence the aggregate distribution of all reports grows smaller, with this inuence converging to zero in the limit. This motivates our denition of a limit mechanism:
Denition 11. A limit mechanism is a function:
that indicates an agent's outcome as a function of his report θ ∈ Θ and the distribution of all agents' reports m ∈ ∆Θ. The limit mechanism φ ∞ is the limit of mechanism Φ n if, for all θ, m:
where φ n is as dened in (1).
A feature of our method of taking the limit is that each φ n in the sequence is random, in the sense that the types of the agent's n−1 opponents are stochastic (drawn from distribution m). In the limit this randomness vanishes due to the law of large numbers, and so φ ∞ itself is not random in this way. This is in contrast with, e.g., Debreu and Scarf 's (1963) replicator economy, or with the approach pioneered by Aumann (1964) that looks directly at a continuum economy. This randomness seems intuitively appealing in the context of the study of large anonymous mechanisms.
Assumption 3. Mechanisms have limits.
Most (if not all) practical market design mechanisms we are aware of have limits, but we note that it is very easy to construct examples of mechanisms that do not. For instance, if a mechanism acts dierently depending on whether n is even or odd it will not have a limit.
A Distinction Between Two Kinds of Non-Strategyproofness
We propose the following distinction between kinds of manipulations.
Denition 12. Suppose, as in (2) , that 
Else, we say that the manipulation vanishes with market size.
We sometimes refer to manipulations that persist with market size as rstorder manipulations and to manipulations that vanish with market size as second-order manipulations. The desiderata that we propose as a secondbest alternative to strategyproofness is that mechanisms not have rst-order manipulations:
Equivalently, a mechanism is SP (p) if all nite-economy manipulations vanish with market size. If a mechanism has manipulations that persist with market size then it is manipulable by price takers, or Manip(p).
We use the terminology price takers because the agents in our limit economy are like the price-taking agents familiar in other areas of economics. Further, the most familiar examples of mechanisms that are SP (p) are those that use prices e.g., the Walrasian mechanism or double auctions. However, there are many mechanisms that do not explicitly use prices that are nevertheless SP (p). There also are numerous mechanisms that do explicitly use prices that nevertheless are manipulable even for price takers. In the following section we describe a class of mechanisms for which checking whether the mechanism is SP (p) or M anip(p) is especially simple.
3.3
Mechanisms with p-Based Representations
In general a mechanism is a sequence of functions that maps a vector of actions to a vector of outcomes. A number of the mechanisms we are interested in have a more compact representation: Denition 14. Mechanism (Φ n ) N has a p-based representation if there exists a compact set P , an onto p-function p : ∆Θ → P , and an outcome function x : Θ × P → X such that, for all n and allθ ∈ Θ n :
In words, when a mechanism has a p-based representation, each agent's outcome is a function of his own report and a set of statistics, p. 
Proof. By 
hence by Denition 13 the mechanism is M anip(p).
That is, to check whether a mechanism is SP (p), we just need to study the outcome function. If, for any xed prices p, reporting truthfully selects each type of agent's most preferred outcome, then the mechanism is SP (p). If not, it is not. We call this set of potential outcomes the agent's opportunity set:
Denition 15. In a mechanism with a p-based representation, the opportunity set at p is the set {x(θ , p)} θ ∈Θ . 
But from Remark 1 we also have that
Putting these two inequalities together we have the following interpretation: by misreporting asθ i instead of θ i , the agent changes the mechanism's statistics (prices) from p top, and this change in statistics is suciently advantageous for the agent that it more than compensates for the fact that, at these new statisticsp, the agent is allocated a bundle based on false preferencesθ i and not his true preferences θ i . If he could obtain x(θ i ,p) he would be better o still. Remark 3 (SP(p) and Envy Freeness). If a mechanism has a p-based representation and is SP (p), then it is envy free for truthful players. That is, for all types θ i and θ j and any realization of the statistics p, we have:
An agent who misreports, even if this misreporting is protable, is not guaranteed an envy free allocation. That is because it is possible, in the terminology of Remark 2, to have
in which case type θ i prots from misreporting as typeθ i , but will envy any other agent who reports θ i .
In practice, Remark 3 enables a market administrator to advise participants that Only reporting truthfully guarantees that you will prefer your allocation to any other agents' allocation. This is not as powerful a piece of strategic advice as that enabled by a strategyproof mechanism, but it may nevertheless be useful in practice. In particular, if a mechanism has a p-based representation and is SP (p), then truthful reporting may be a safe strategy in the informal sense of Roth (2008).
Examples
In this section we illustrate the concepts of Section 3 with a series of examples.
Our rst example is uniform-price and pay-as-bid auctions, two mechanisms best known for their use in the allocation of government securities. The former is an example of a price-based mechanism that is SP (p), the latter an example of a price-based mechanism that is M anip(p).
Example 1 (Multi-Unit Auctions). There are qn units of a homogeneous good, with q ∈ Z + .
To simplify notation, we assume that agents' preferences take the form of linear utility functions, up to a capacity limit. Specically, each agent i's type consists of a per-unit value v i and a maximum capacity q i , with V = {1, . . . ,v} the set of possible values, Q = {1, . . . ,q} the set of possible capacity limits, and Θ = V × Q. The set of possible actions is just A = Θ, with τ the identify function.
For both Uniform-Price and Pay-as-Bid auctions, price is calculated as a function of the reportsθ as follows: tions, and seems to be less concerned by the second-order manipulability of the uniform-price auction.
Our next example is the Boston mechanism for school choice, a mechanism that does not explicitly have prices in the description (though it does have a p-based representation, as we will see below). As mentioned in the introduction, this mechanism was criticized by Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (2003) and Abdulkadiroglu et al (2006) for not being strategyproof. We show something stronger, which is that it is not even SP (p).
Example 2 (Boston Mechanism). Let X 0 be the set of schools, each with capacity q = n |X0| . Agents' types take the form of von-Neumann Morgenstern utility functions over the set of schools, i.e., functions of the form u θ : X 0 → {0, 1, . . . ,ū} for large integerū. The set of actions A is the set of ordinal preferences over X 0 , with τ (θ) denoting the true ordinal preferences of type θ.
The Boston mechanism awards as many students as possible their reported rst choice school; then, awards as many students as possible their reported second choice school; etc. To keep the description concise we focus just on the rst choices. Let d 1 j denote the number of students who report that school j ∈ X 0 is their rst choice: these students receive school j with probability min(1,
6 The notation 1{statement} denotes the indicator function which returns 1 if the statement is true and 0 if the statement is false.
In the limit, if the measure of agents' reports is dθ, then the probability that a student who ranks j rst gets it can be calculated as p * j = min(1, 1 |X 0 |´1{j is first choice}dθ )
Notice that in the limit mechanism each agent regards the p * j 's as exogenous to their own report. Agent θ will wish to misreport her rst choice school if there exists j = j such that u θ (j)p * j < u θ (j )p * j . Therefore the mechanism is M anip(p).
Our next example contrasts two mechanisms for the course-allocation problem that are based on articcial currency markets. The widely-used Bidding Points Auction, studied by Sonmez and Unver (2010) Example 3 (Course Allocation). Let C be the set of courses, and X 0 the powerset of C (for convenience we ignore scheduling constraints). Each course has capacity q = κn , with κ ∈ [0, 1]. Students have additive-separable preferences over courses, normalized so that their utility from consuming one seat in each course is b ∈ Z + . Specically, student i's type is described by a vector v i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , b} |C| where component v ij indicates i's utility from course j, and j v ij = b. Her utility from schedule x ∈ X 0 is j v ij 1{c ∈ x}. The set of possible actions is equal to the set of types.
In both the Bidding Points Auction and CEEI, the constant b will play the role of students' budgets of an articial currency with no outside use. Suppose the agents submit type prole v. In the Bidding Points Auction (cf. Sonmez and Unver, 2010), prices are calculated as in a real-money multi-unit Vickrey auction, as follows:
Then, the q highest bidders for j are awarded a seat in the course. In the limit, the formula becomes
It is easy to see that, despite the resemblance to the strategyproof Vickrey auction, the BPA is M anip(p). The reason is that agent i's most preferred aordable bundle at price vector p * is
but the BPA instead awards agent i the bundle
Whenever
, agent i prots from misreporting. Budish (2010) proposes an alternative mechanism that award agents bundles according to (5) , which helps ensure SP (p). This requires nding dierent prices general equilibrium theory prices rather than auction-theory prices the existence of which requires that agents be given slightly unequal budgets. 
Main Results
Our main result is that, in our class of mechanisms, strategyproofness is in a certain sense free in the limit and approximately free in large nite economies, relative to Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility and complete information Nash 
Limit Result for Bayes-Nash Equilibria
Our limit result is the following:
Theorem 1 (Limit Result for BNE). Consider a mechanism (Φ n ) N with BayesNash equilibria σ n µ continuous in reports and strategies, and with lim n→∞ σ n µ = σ ∞ µ . There exists another mechanism (F n ) N that is strategyproof for price takers and gives agents the same utilities as the original mechanism (Φ n ) n∈N in the limit. That is, for any type θ ∈ Θ and any prior µ ∈ ∆Θ,
Proof. We construct the mechanism (F n ) N as follows. Suppose in a market of size n agents reportθ. Let m = emp[θ] denote the empirical distribution ofθ in ∆Θ. Let:
In words, F n plays action σ n m (θ i ) for agent i who reports θ i , where m is not the true distribution of agents' types µ (which is not known to the mechanism) but rather the empirical distribution of agents' reports. (In the Bayes-Nash equilibria of Φ n agent θ i plays σ n µ (θ i )). As in (1) above, the object f n (θ i |m) denotes an agents' outcome under F n when he reports θ i and the n − 1 other agents' reports are distributed iid according to some m ∈ ∆Θ.
Lemma 1. For each m ∈ ∆Θ and each θ i ,θ i ∈ Θ,
Proof of Lemma. By the construction of (F n ) n∈N we have
where θ −i is an n − 1 vector of types drawn iid according to m, and then
Hence, we need to show that
gets small as n gets large. Without loss of generality, normalize utility functions such that the range of each u θ is [0, 1] . Let 
< δ} denote the set of realizations of θ −i such that the realized empirical distribution is close to the distribution, m, from which each of the n − 1 elements of θ −i are drawn iid. Fix > 0. By equicontinuity in strategies, we can choose δ > 0 such that, if the realization of θ −i is in B n δ , then the realized value of (8) is less than 2
. By the law of large numbers, we have that the probability that θ −i is in B n δ converges to 1 as n → ∞; in particular we can take n 0 large enough such that, for all n ≥ n 0 , the probability that the realization of θ −i is in B n δ is at least 1− 2 . In the other 2 of cases, the realization of (8) is at most 1, because of our utility normalization. Hence
which completes the proof of the lemma.
Given the Lemma on the limit of our mechanism (F n ) N , the next step is to show that in this limit it is a dominant strategy for each type to report truthfully. This requires that for any type θ i , any alternate reportθ i , and any distribution m, we have that:
which given the Lemma is equivalent to:
which obtains because σ ∞ m is the limit of the sequence of Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategies (σ n m ) N . That is, if agents' report according to m, and so σ ∞ m is the limit Bayes-Nash equilibrium that is activated by our new mechanism (F n ) N , then each type θ i wants to report his own type truthfully, so that the mechanism plays the correct BNE response on his behalf. Since this obtains for any m ∈ ∆Θ, we have dominant strategy incentives in the limit, as required.
The remaining step is to show that truthful play of our new mechanism coincides with Bayes-Nash equilibrium play of the original mechanism in the limit. This follows from the Lemma, setting m equal to the true prior, µ.
The key idea in the proof is (7), which indicates how to construct the SP (p) mechanism (F n ) N given the Bayes-Nash mechanism (Φ n ) N . In words, the empirical distribution of agents' reports, m ∈ ∆Θ, activates the Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategy σ m (·). An agent who reports type θ thus plays what her Bayes-Nash equilibrium action would have been if the true prior were m, not µ. By construction, the distribution of opponents' actions will be very close to what it would have been were the true prior m, and then everyone played according to σ m (·). Thus, even if m is very dierent from the true prior µ, our agent remains happy to have told the truth it does not matter that the true prior is µ, because the other plays are behaving as if the true prior is m.
This trick is the reason why our mechanism in (7) provides dominantstrategy incentives as opposed to just Bayes-Nash incentives. Furthermore, this trick allows the mechanism to be prior free for the participants; they need not actually know the true µ to play the mechanism, they just need report their true type.
Our mechanism (F n ) N is importantly dierent from a traditional Bayes-Nash direct revelation mechanism (cf. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991; Section 7.2). In a traditional Bayes-Nash DRM, the mechanism needs to know the prior µ. It then announces a BNE strategy σ µ (·), and plays σ µ (θ) on behalf of an agent who reports θ. Our mechanism infers a prior from the empirical distribution of agents' play. If agents indeed play truthfully, this inference is exactly correct in the limit. But if the other agents misreport according toμ = µ for some reason, then the mechanism automatically adjusts each agent's play to be the Bayes-Nash equilibrium play in a world where the prior was in factμ. Thus, an agent who tells the truth remains happy to have done so, which is not the case in a traditional Bayes-Nash DRM.
Large Finite Markets
The technique of using the empirical distribution of agents' play to activate a particular Bayes-Nash equilibrium, hence in fact providing dominant strategy incentives, works exactly in the limit. That is, in the limit strategyproofness is free relative to Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility. Our next result shows that our technique works approximately in large nite economies, with the approximation error vanishing exponentially in market size.
Denition 16. In the n-mechanism Φ n , truthful play is an -Best Response for type θ i to prole θ −i if, for all alternative reports θ i ∈ Θ:
The n-mechanism Φ n is ( ,ρ)-strategyproof if, for all types θ i ∈ Θ, and all m ∈ ∆Θ: if the other n − 1 players' reports are distributed iid according to m, then the probability that truthful play is an -Best Response for θ i is at least 1 − ρ.
In words, a mechanism is ( , ρ)-strategyproof if, for every possible distribution of opponents' play, the probability that a player has a protable deviation is small; specically, a deviation worth more than occurs less than ρ of the time. Our notion is adapted from Kalai's (2004) notion of ( , ρ)-Ex Post Equilibrium.
The dierence is that approximate ex-post equilibrium considers only the case where opponents' actions take on the equilibrium distribution σ µ (µ), whereas our concept allows for any distribution m ∈ ∆Θ. Kalai shows that, for any > 0, Bayes-Nash equilibria are ( , αβ n )-ex post Nash for suitable constants α, β. We use ideas from Kalai's proof to show that our mechanism (F n ) N from the proof of Theorem 1, in which the empirical distribution of reportsm activates strategy σ n m (·), obeys an analogous bound. The bound is with respect both to approximate strategyproofness and with respect to matching the outcome of the original Bayesian mechanism from which our mechanism is derived.
Theorem 2 (Large Finite Markets Result for BNE). Consider a mechanism (Φ n ) N with Bayes-Nash equilibria σ n µ continuous in reports and strategies. There exists another mechanism (F n ) N with the following property: For any > 0, there exist constants α > 0 (= α((Φ n ) N , )) and 0 < β < 1 (= β((Φ n ) N , )), such that the mechanism (F n ) N :
1. is ( , αβ n )-strategyproof in markets of size n 2. has outcomes under truthful play that ( , αβ n ) approximate the BayesNash equilibrium outcomes under the original mechanism. Specically, for all θ i , and for θ −i drawn iid according to the true prior µ, we have
The proof of Theorem 2 is contained in Appendix A. The rst step of the proof shows that, for any belief about the distribution of opponents' reports m, truth telling under our mechanism approximately maximizes expected utility.
The reason this is true for the true belief, µ, is the continuity in strategies assumption: if players report truthfully, the empirical distributionμ will be close to the true distribution µ, and hence σμ(·) will be close in terms of outcomes to σ µ (·). The reason this then can be extended to any belief m = µ is continuity combined with the method of mechanism construction: if the expectation is m, then the realizationm will be close to m, and hence the activated strategy σm(·) will be close to the expected strategy σ m (·).
The second step of the proof then uses the expected utility analysis and law of large numbers techniques due to Kalai (2004) to show that truth telling also approximately maximizes realized utility, with high probability.
Remark 4 (Small Cost of Optimizing). Suppose that there is a cost c > 0 associated with calculating an optimal strategy, that truthful reporting is costless, and (wlog) that the range of each u θ is [0, 1]. Then Theorem 2 implies that in a large enough nite market, for any conjecture m ∈ ∆Θ about how the other agents will play, reporting truthfully and hence avoiding the cost c is expected utility maximizing in our mechanism. Simply set = c 2 and then choose n large enough that αβ n ≤ c 2 .
Results for Complete Information Nash Equilibria [Especially preliminary]
In this section we provide results analogous to Theorems 1 and 2 but for complete information Nash equilibria, instead of Bayes-Nash equilibria. It is important to keep in mind that assuming that a mechanism has complete information Nash equilibria is very dierent from assuming that participants actually have complete information.
Theorem 3 (Limit Result for NE). Consider a mechanism (Φ n ) N with complete information Nash equilibria σ n θ continuous in reports and strategies. There exists another mechanism (F n ) N that is strategyproof for price takers and gives agents the same utilities as the original mechanism (Φ n ) n∈N in the limit.
Theorem 4 (Large Finite Markets Result for NE). Consider a mechanism (Φ n ) N with complete information Nash equilibria σ n θ continuous in reports and strategies. There exists another mechanism (F n ) N with the following property:
For any
1. is ( , αβ n )-strategyproof in markets of size n 2. has outcomes under truthful play that exactly coincide with the complete information Nash equilibrium outcomes under the original mechanism.
The mechanism we use to prove these results is especially simple:
In words, the mechanism computes a complete-information Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the players' reports, and then executes these actions on behalf of each player. Note, somewhat subtly, that it is not actually a Nash equilibrium for each player to report their preferences truthfully to this mechanism in nite markets. The reason is that, by changing one's report from say θ i toθ i , one changes the prole of reported types from sayθ toθ, and this in turn changes the strategy that is activated from σ (·), even though the strategy varies slightly with i's own report. Since this argument holds for anyθ −i , our mechanism transforms exact complete-information Nash equilibria into a mechanism that provides approximate dominant strategy incentives.
Note as well that, if agents tell the truth in nite markets, this mechanism produces outcomes that are identical to the outcomes under the NE of the original mechanism. By contrast with BNE our mechanism only approximates the nite market outcomes (cf. how Theorem 4(2) is stronger than Theorem 2(2)).
An Empirical Application A recent paper by Budish and Cantillon (2011) applies the mechanism (10) empirically, in the context of course allocation at
Harvard Business School. The original mechanism (Φ n ) N is HBS's draft mechanism, in which students take turns choosing courses one at a time over a series of rounds. They call the constructed mechanism (F n ) N the proxy draft, to denote that students submit their preferences to the mechanism, which then acts as a strategic proxy on each student's behalf. They nd evidence that the proxy draft improves welfare relative to the original mechanism, in part because it prevents strategic mistakes. That is, the robustness of dominant strategy equilibria has a payo in terms of welfare. Two Notes of Caution Our arguments above suggest that SP (p) may be viewed as a kind of necessary condition for good design in large anonymous settings. However we conclude with a note of caution about viewing it as sucient.
Though a useful approximation in many markets of interest, the assumption of price-taking behavior is never exactly correct. Even wheat farmers are atomic.
That said, we anticipate that market designers will often be faced with the following choice: use a mechanism that is attractive under truthful play and SP (p), but not strategyproof; or, use a mechanism that is less attractive under truthful play but exactly strategyproof ? Our paper also cautions against ignoring the former in favor of the latter, which is what researchers do whenever they limit attention to strategyproof mechanisms.
A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2. For ease of exposition x arbitrary θ i ∈ ∆Θ, n ∈ N, m ∈ ∆Θ, but note that the analysis holds uniformly for any such values.
Step 1. Bound variation in expected utility under original mechanism (Φ n ) N due to variation in σ m (·).
We know that if i's n − 1 opponents draw their types iid according to m, and then play the original mechanism Φ n using strategy σ 
The rst step in our argument is to use equicontinuity of strategies to show that (11) We will argue below that such strategy prolesm are likely under our mechanism.
Step 2. Bound variation in realized utility under new mechanism (F n ) N due to variation in θ −i .
Recall that our new mechanism (F n ) N is constructed from the original mechanism (Φ n ) N according to 
In words, (17) says that the realized payo from playingθ i goes up by at most 2 relative to the expected payo, conditional on being in the region of θ −i where |emp[θ −i ] − m| sup < δ2 2
. The next equation (18) says that the realized payo from playing θ i goes down by at most 2 relative to the expected payo.
Step 3. Combine the bounds from Steps 1 and 2 to get an overall bound on the gain from misreporting, for a region of θ −i .
If we condition as well on |emp[θ i , θ −i ] − m| < δ 1 and |emp[θ i , θ −i ] − m| < δ 1 , then we can combine (17) , (18) and (14) 
for all realizations of θ −i satisfying:
1. |emp(θ i , θ −i ) − m| sup < δ 1 for all θ i ∈ Θ 2. |emp[θ −i ] − m| sup < δ2 2 with δ 1 and δ 2 constants that are uniform over n, m.
Step 4. Bound the probability with which θ −i is in the appropriate region.
Hence, we can limit i's gain from misreporting to ≡ 2 1 + 2 2 > 0, with probability of at least the probability that events (1) and (2) occur given that θ −i is drawn iid according to m. By Kalai's Lemma 5, the probability that (1) is not satised is less than 2|Θ|e −2[(nδ1−1)/(n−1)] 2 (n−1) and by Kalai's Lemma 4 the probability that (2) is not satised is less than 2|Θ|e −2( Step 5. Complete the proof by showing that the analysis implies that (F n ) N is close to (Φ n ) N in utility terms as well.
The last step in the proof is to show that, for all θ i , and for θ −i drawn iid according to the true prior µ, we have Pr[u θi [F By equicontinuity in strategies, there exists δ > 0 such that (20) is less than whenever |emp(θ) − µ| sup < . We can use the same δ 1 as in Step 1, hence (20) is less than 1 < whenever event (i) in Step 3 occurs for m = µ. By Step 4 this occurs with probability of at least 1 − αβ n .
